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Children’s ability to use speaker certainty 
in learning novel words
Myrthe Bergstra, Hannah De Mulder and Peter Coopmans
Utrecht University
One of the cues that children might use in learning words is the level of certainty 
that speakers demonstrate in their naming of a novel object. This study pre-
sented 52 4–5 year old Dutch children with a word-learning task in which two 
puppets each used the same label for a different novel object. In three conditions, 
puppets expressed their level of speaker certainty lexically (e.g. ‘I know this is a 
mit’ vs. ‘I think this is a mit’), they used discourse means to convey certainty (e.g. 
‘I play with this a lot. Yes, a mit’, vs. ‘I’ve never played with this. Well, a mit’) or 
they combined the two. In all conditions, children were more likely to pick the 
object referred to by the more certain puppet as the referent of the new word, 
demonstrating that speaker certainty is a relevant cue in the word learning 
process.
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1. Introduction
1.1 The role of the interlocutor in word learning
Children acquire word meanings at a remarkable speed. How exactly children 
might be capable of this feat has been the topic of a good deal of literature. Much 
of previous work has focused on word learning strategies concerning the possible 
referents of words (e.g. constraints suggested by Markman 1994), although it is 
clear that children also need to focus on what the person labeling the objects might 
intend to pick out in the environment. Therefore, some of children’s strategies in 
word learning might concern their interlocutor. One potentially relevant factor 
might be the reliability of the information source, as object labeling is not nec-
essarily always accurate: A speaker might make a mistake or be unsure about a 
label (cf. Sabbagh & Baldwin 2001; Birch, Vauthier & Bloom 2008). To prevent 
the learning of incorrect word labels, the child then faces the task of determining 
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who is a reliable source of information and who is not. Several studies have shown 
that children are better at learning from a source that was previously reliable than 
from a source that was unreliable and that they are more likely to trust the novel 
object labels of a speaker who previously labeled objects accurately than from a 
speaker who was inaccurate (cf. Birch et al. 2008; Scofield & Behrend 2008; Ganea, 
Koenig & Millett 2011). Most of the studies in this field have used experimental 
paradigms involving a reliable and an unreliable speaker, but Sabbagh & Baldwin 
(2001) considered differences in speaker reliability from one time to another (as 
the same speaker might be knowledgeable about one label but ignorant about an-
other). Sabbagh & Baldwin (2001) thus conducted an experiment in which a single 
speaker was knowledgeable about the referent of the word in one condition, but 
ignorant in another. In the knowledgeable condition, the speaker said: “You know, 
I’d like to help my friend Birdie, and I know just which one’s her blicket. It’s this 
one.” In the ignorant condition, however, the speaker said: “You know, I’d like 
to help my friend Birdie, but I don’t know what a blicket is. Hmmm. Maybe, it’s 
this one.” (Sabbagh & Baldwin 2001: 1057). They found that children were more 
inclined to accept the novel word-object pairing when the speaker was knowl-
edgeable. As taking into account the level of knowledge of a speaker may prevent 
children from making word learning errors, this focus on the interlocutor would 
seem to be a useful learning strategy.
1.2 Speaker certainty in a word learning context
Beliefs can be held with different levels of certainty, which a speaker can express 
using mental state verbs like know and think. As such, speakers have various lin-
guistic means available to them to express their level of certainty. To understand 
these linguistic encodings of speaker certainty, a child must not only understand 
that another person can have different beliefs to her own, but also that these be-
liefs can be held with different levels of certainty (Moore, Pure & Furrow 1990). 
Understanding the difference between words like know and think is quite hard 
for children. These mental state verbs are generally not used before the end of 
the child’s third year, and, even then, they are not well distinguished from one 
another in comprehension (Papafragou, Cassidy & Gleitman 2007). Around the 
age of four, however, children start to understand the differences between mental 
state verbs like know and think, as demonstrated in an experiment by Moore et al. 
(1990). In this experiment, children had to find a sweet which was hidden in either 
a blue box or a red box. To find it, the children had to listen to two puppets who 
used the words know and think in their directions to the child. For example, one 
puppet would say: “I think the sweet is in the blue box”, whereas the other puppet 
would say: “I know the sweet is in the red box”. The children were then asked to 
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find the sweet. If they fully understood the difference between know and think, 
they would look in the red box, as the puppet whose directions led to the red box 
was certain, whereas the other puppet was not. Moore et al. (1990) found that 
there were significant improvements in the performance on this task between the 
ages of three and four (coinciding with the development of Theory of Mind (ToM), 
the ability to understand that other people’s beliefs may differ from your own), 
suggesting that this is when children develop an understanding of know and think 
and appreciate the differences in speaker certainty that they encode.
Previous research thus suggests that 4 year old children are not only capable 
of understanding speaker certainty, but that they can also use it to decide where to 
look for a hidden object (cf. also De Mulder 2011). As mentioned above, Sabbagh 
& Baldwin (2001) showed that children are also more likely to learn a word from 
a knowledgeable speaker than from an ignorant one. The present study aimed to 
investigate whether children will learn words from a certain speaker rather than 
from an uncertain speaker in a situation in which there is a direct contrast of 
speaker certainty. Since a speaker can show his certainty towards what he says in 
many different ways, a second aim was to investigate whether the way in which 
speaker certainty is conveyed would matter. In the current study, speaker certainty 
was manipulated both at the lexical level (using the mental state verbs know and 
think), but also at the discourse level. Imagine someone saying: “My keys are in my 
bag. I just put them there” and compare this with a doubtful “Mm… my keys are 
in my bag..”. Clearly, there is a difference in certainty between these expressions, 
even though this certainty is not expressed using mental state verbs here. To assess 
to what extent this different encoding of speaker certainty influences children’s 
word learning, three different conditions were compared: Speaker certainty was 
either conveyed using mental state verbs, through discourse or by a combination 
of the two. The procedure of the experiment was as follows: A child was presented 
with two puppets. Each puppet had an object in front of him, which the child had 
never seen before (they were made especially for the experiment). In one condi-
tion, Puppet A said: “I know this is a mit” and pointed to the object in front of him. 
Puppet B then said: “I think this is a mit” and pointed to the other object, the one 
that was in front of him. Two objects were thus labelled mit, but, whereas puppet 
A was certain about his naming, puppet B demonstrated uncertainty. The child 
was then asked to point at the mit. If she understands the difference in speaker 
certainty the puppets conveyed by using a particular mental state verb, the child 
should point to the object of puppet A, since he was the puppet that was certain 
about what he said. The other two conditions had a very similar set-up, but the 
ways of expressing speaker certainty differed somewhat (see Section 2.2).
The experimental paradigm used in the current study is thus very similar to 
earlier studies (cf. Moore et al. 1990; Birch et al. 2008; Scofield & Behrend 2008; 
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Ganea et al. 2011), however, the particular research question we aim to address 
(whether speaker certainty and the specific way in which it is conveyed plays a 
role in children’s ability to learn new words), has not been addressed before. The 
results of this study should thus shed light on the extent to which speaker certainty 
(and the particular way in which it is encoded) has an effect on children’s word 
learning.
2. Method
2.1 Participants
52 Dutch 4 and 5 year old children (range: 4;1–6;0) from one elementary school 
in the Netherlands participated in the experiment. Each child was assigned to one 
condition (see Table 1).
Table 1. Participants per condition
N Mean age 4 year olds (n) 5 year oldsa (n)
Mental state verbs 18 5;1 7 11
Discourse 18 5;0 8 10
Combination 16 5;1 5 11
aOne of the 5 year olds in the discourse condition was 6;0
Children started with two practice items in which two puppets named objects that 
the children knew (e.g. “This is a bike”) with one of the puppets pointing to a bike 
and the other pointing to another object (one puppet was right on the first practice 
item, the other was right on the second practice item). The child was then asked 
to point to the bike. One 4 year old was not able to do this and was thus excluded 
(leaving 16 children in the combination condition).
2.2 Procedure
The children were tested individually in a separate room in their school. Each ses-
sion lasted about twenty minutes and included the word learning task, a Theory of 
Mind task and a measure of general receptive vocabulary (described in the follow-
ing sections). Two adults were present throughout: The experimenter and an as-
sistant. Two different testing orders were administered to reduce unwanted order 
effects. After the testing, children were rewarded with a small toy.
Children were told that the puppets would name unfamiliar objects and that 
they had to listen carefully, because they would not have seen the objects before. 
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Each puppet had one novel object in front of him and gave it a label (a nonsense 
word, see the appendix for the stimuli). Each child received one of the three con-
ditions (mental state verb, discourse or a combination). In the mental state verb 
condition, children were given the task portrayed in Figure 1:
Puppet A
Child
I think
this is
a mit
I know
this is
a mit
Puppet B
Figure 1. Procedure
Puppet 1: “I know this is a mit.” Points at the object in front of him.
Puppet 2: “I think this is a mit.” Points at the object in front of him.
The child was then asked to point at ‘the mit’. In order to be successful, the child 
had to pick the object of the puppet that used the word know, because this was the 
puppet that had demonstrated a higher level of speaker certainty in his naming of 
the object.
In the discourse condition, speaker certainty was expressed through discourse 
in which the puppets talked about their familiarity with the object (no mental 
state verbs were used). The puppet that was very certain would thus tell the child: 
“I have seen this before. Look, this is how you pick it up (picking up the object in 
front of him). I have played with this a lot, because I have it at home, too. Yes, a 
mit.” Following this, the uncertain puppet would tell the child that he had never 
seen the object in front of him before, did not know how to pick it up, and had 
never played with it, concluding with “Well… a mit”. (There was no manipulation 
of intonation except for the natural differences in intonation that come with the 
expressions ‘yes’ and ‘well…’.)
In the third, “combination”-condition, both discourse and mental state verbs 
were used. The procedure was almost identical to the second condition. The pup-
pets first talked about their familiarity with the object. However, instead of con-
cluding “Yes, a mit.” or “Well… a mit”, they concluded “I know this is a mit” or “I 
think this is a mit.” In this condition, the puppets thus expressed their certainty in 
discourse as well as through mental state verbs.
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Each child was given eight trials of this task (for an 8 point maximum score). 
The order in which the puppets spoke was varied, so that each puppet came first 
half of the time and last half of the time. Whether the first puppet who spoke was 
the certain or uncertain puppet was also counterbalanced so that test order would 
not influence the results. To make sure that the children were not just choosing the 
object that they liked the most, each child was asked to pick her favourite object 
out of every pair of novel objects. Since there was only one child for whom, in 
every trial, the object she chose was the same as the object that was her favourite, 
it was assumed that this was not a general tendency and that this case was likely to 
be a coincidence (analysing the results with the data from this child excluded did 
not change the findings). There was no pair of objects for which all children picked 
the same object as their favourite.
2.2.1 Measuring Theory of Mind
Aside from the word learning task, every child was also given a Theory of Mind 
test in order to determine whether the two tasks might be correlated. To measure 
Theory of Mind, a false belief task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith 1985) was con-
ducted in which a story character initially places a marble in one container which 
is then moved to another container in the story character’s absence. Two different 
versions of this task were conducted in which the child was asked two test ques-
tions that assessed her understanding of the story character’s false belief regarding 
the location of the marble (“Where will the story character look for the marble?” 
followed by “Why will he look there?”). For each correct answer they received one 
point, so they could score a total of 4 points (2 questions x 2 trials). The expla-
nations were judged to be correct if the response included something about the 
original location of the marble (“first it was in the box”) or about the story char-
acter’s belief about the marble (“he thinks it is in the box”). The children were also 
asked two control questions to make sure they had been paying attention and had 
remembered what had happened (“Where is the marble really?” and “Where was 
the marble first?”). All children answered these control questions correctly.
2.2.2 Measuring vocabulary
Receptive vocabulary was measured using the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test 
III (Schlichting 2005). This task was a control task to make sure the child had no 
general vocabulary difficulties.
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3. Results
3.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows the means, standard deviations and ranges of the tests.1 It should be 
noted that the mean of the Theory of Mind test is only 2.13 with a high standard 
deviation (only half of the children passed this test).
Table 3 shows the mean results per condition.
Table 2. Overall means, standard deviations and ranges
Mean Standard 
deviation
Range
Age in months 61.08  6.46 49–72
PPVT-R 71.56 14.76 20–98
Theory of Mind  2.13  1.88  0–4 max = 4
Word learning  5.02  1.60  2–8 max = 8
Note: PPVT-R: Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test Raw score.
Table 3. Descriptives per condition
Age 
(months)
Theory of Mind Word Learning PPVT-R
Mental state verbs 61.11 1.72 4.72 66.78
Discourse 60.44 2.44 4.72 72.39
Combination 61.75 2.25 5.69 76.00
Note: PPVTR: Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test Raw score.
3.2 Correlations
To find out if the performances on the different tests were correlated with each 
other and with the age of the child, correlations between these variables were in-
vestigated. Table 4 shows all the bivariate Pearson correlations.
Table 4. Correlations
Age PPVT-R Theory of Mind
PPVT-R .486**
Theory of Mind .368** .268
Word learning
Mental state verb
 Discourse
 Combination
.316*
.279
.213
.435
.286*
.294
.063
.398
.162
.242
.054
.181
Note * p<.05; ** p<.01
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Table 4 shows significant positive correlations with age for all tests, that is, chil-
dren get better across the board as they grow older. For the conditions of the word 
learning task separately no correlation was found, but this could be due to the 
small number of participants per condition (18, 18 and 16 respectively).
The word learning task also correlates weakly (r = .286) with the PPVT raw 
score, suggesting that current vocabulary is connected to the ability to learn new 
words. Again, no correlation with the conditions separately was found.
Remarkably, no correlation was found between Theory of Mind and perfor-
mance on the word learning task. This is unexpected, as it was assumed that un-
derstanding speaker certainty (which is tested in the word learning task) is closely 
connected to understanding someone else’s beliefs (which is tested in the ToM 
task). We will look into the relation between ToM and word learning in a bit more 
detail in Section 3.3.2.
3.3 Analyses
The goal of this study was to investigate whether children are able to use speaker 
certainty to learn new words. To see if children are capable of doing this, we need 
to know if they scored above chance level (i.e. a score higher than 4 out of 8) in 
the word learning task. As shown in Table 1, the mean in the word learning task 
was 5.02 (with results from all three conditions combined). A one sample t-test 
showed that this was significantly above chance level (p<.001). In the three condi-
tions separately (means 4.72 for the mental verb condition, 4.72 for the discourse 
condition and 5.69 for the combined condition), the children also scored signifi-
cantly above chance level (p=.023, p=.044 and p<.001 respectively), suggesting 
that 4 and 5 year old children are indeed capable of using speaker certainty in 
word learning. When the performance of 4 year olds (n = 20) and 5 year olds (n 
= 32) is considered separately, analyses show that both 4 year olds (mean score = 
4.40) and 5 year olds (mean score = 5.41) score significantly above chance level 
(p=.028 and p<.001 respectively) and that the 5 year olds perform significantly 
better than the 4 year olds (p<.001). This finding thus suggests that the ability to 
use speaker certainty in word learning is still developing in the 4 year olds, how-
ever, due to the small sample size, differences between the 4 and 5 year olds are not 
investigated further in the additional analyses reported in the following sections.
3.3.1 Means of expressing speaker certainty
The second research question was whether children would perform differently ac-
cording to how speaker certainty is conveyed (via mental state verbs, discourse or 
a combination). A one-way ANOVA analysis was used to investigate whether the 
children performed significantly differently in these three groups. It turned out 
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that there was no significant difference at the p <.05 level between the conditions 
(F(2, 49)= 2.10, p=.13). These results suggest that the way in which speaker certainty 
is expressed does not influence 4 and 5 year old children’s performance on the 
word learning task.
3.3.2 ToM and word learning
In Section 3.2 we showed that no correlation was found between ToM and word 
learning. To look into this relation in a bit more detail, the ToM score was also 
coded as pass/fail (with children with a score below 3 considered as failers (n = 26) 
and children with scores of 3 or higher considered passers (n = 26)). Analysis with 
this binary ToM division demonstrated that although ToM passers scored higher 
on the word learning task than failers (5.31 vs. 4.73), there was no statistically sig-
nificant difference between the two groups.
4. Conclusion and discussion
Speaker certainty is the amount of certainty a speaker has towards the proposition 
he utters; he can be certain about it (know it) or uncertain (think it). Children 
begin to understand this speaker certainty at around the age of four, the same time 
at which they develop a Theory of Mind. This study investigated whether speaker 
certainty could be used as a strategy in the learning of new words. Other studies 
have already shown that children of 4 years old are able to use speaker certainty 
in an object finding task (Moore et al. 1990; De Mulder 2011) and that children 
are more willing to learn words from reliable rather than unreliable sources (Birch 
et al. 2008) and from knowledgeable rather than ignorant speakers (Sabbagh & 
Baldwin 2001). The present study combined these findings to formulate a new 
question: Are children more likely to learn a word from a certain speaker than 
from an uncertain speaker in a situation in which there is a direct contrast of 
speaker certainty? To answer this question, an experiment was conducted in 
which children had to follow the directions of a certain and an uncertain puppet 
to decide to which object a new word might refer. The results of this study showed 
that 4 and 5 year old children are indeed capable of doing this, as they scored 
significantly above chance level in their tendency to follow the certain puppet. 
Although the 5 year olds did not yet score at ceiling (with a score of 5.41 out of 8), 
they did score significantly higher than the 4 year olds suggesting that the ability 
to take into account speaker certainty in word learning is still developing in the 
age range tested in this study.
This study has thus shown that children also actively use strategies concern-
ing their interlocutor (i.e. speaker certainty) to learn new words. This outcome 
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confirms the crucial role of the interlocutor in the child’s learning of words. It 
also shows how children might prevent themselves from learning incorrect word 
labels: By focussing on certain instead of uncertain speakers, the chance of incor-
rectly mapping a novel label onto an object is significantly reduced.
However, one potential limitation of this study should be noted. Although we 
think that by pointing out a particular object in response to our request to “find 
the mit”, children demonstrated that they associated that label with a particular 
novel object (and thus had learnt a new word in the sense that they had made a 
novel word-object pairing), it is not clear from this study to what extent children 
maintained the novel word/object association over time and thus whether they 
had truly learnt novel words in the course of the experiment. In future research, 
we aim to address this issue by assessing whether this kind of word-object link is 
still present after a time delay.
The second research question was about the different ways in which speaker 
certainty can be expressed. Do children perform differently depending on whether 
speaker certainty is conveyed via mental state verbs or through discourse? To an-
swer this question, three conditions of the experiment were compared: One in 
which speaker certainty was expressed lexically through mental state verbs, one 
in which it was expressed through discourse, and one in which the two were com-
bined. There were no significant differences in performance on the word learning 
task between these conditions. This means that children can use speaker certainty 
in learning words, regardless of how this certainty is conveyed exactly. It is enough 
for children when they get the impression of certainty, it does not have to be ex-
plicitly lexicalized as such.
One question still remains unanswered, however, as, unexpectedly, perfor-
mance on the false belief task and the word learning task was not correlated. One 
explanation for this finding might be relatively simple: The fact that the ToM task 
only had a limited scale of 4 points may not have been enough for a meaningful 
correlation to show up. However, it may also be the case that children’s under-
standing of speaker certainty is to some extent distinct from their understanding 
of false beliefs. In order to perform well on the word learning task employed in this 
study, children needed to understand that speakers can vary in the level of certain-
ty with which they hold a certain belief and that this difference in certainty had a 
direct impact on how seriously their act of naming an object should be taken. False 
belief tasks, on the other hand, do not require children to understand differences 
in the strength of a particular belief (the story character in the false belief task 
has no reason to question her belief and thus has no reason to be uncertain about 
where to look for the object). Instead, they focus on children’s understanding of 
people’s behaviour given incorrect (as opposed to uncertain) beliefs about the 
world. Given the fact that this study did not find a correlation between these two 
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domains, it may be the case that the false belief task and the word learning task are 
tapping into different aspects of the child’s cognitive development: Understanding 
of false beliefs and speaker certainty.
By showing that children are more likely to learn words from a certain speaker 
than from an uncertain speaker, this study confirms the crucial role of the inter-
locutor in the word learning process of a child. It shows that children do not only 
use cognitive abilities in establishing label-object links, but also social abilities: By 
considering the certainty of their interlocutor, the child prevents false label learn-
ing from occurring. Another relevant contribution of the study is that it has com-
pared different ways of expressing speaker certainty, and found that children were 
equally capable of making use of different linguistic encodings of speaker certainty. 
In future research, we aim to extend these findings and investigate how important 
speaker certainty really is in the word learning process. For instance, if we cross 
speaker certainty with speaker likeability (e.g. a likeable uncertain speaker and a 
disliked certain speaker give different objects the same novel label) will children 
then only consider the speaker’s certainty level in their mapping of a novel word 
to an object or will the affective value of the speaker also play a role? In this way, 
then, our current study not only demonstrates the importance of speaker certainty 
in word learning, but also paves the way for further investigation into what exactly 
is behind children’s ability to learn novel words at such a remarkably high speed.
Note
1. In the analyses only the raw vocabulary score is taken into account, as using the standardized 
score would entail that age would be taken into account twice (it is already taken into account in 
determining the standardized score).
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Appendix
All stimuli are possible but non-existent monosyllabic words in Dutch:
mit
vlaar
kloef
glap
daks
guik
wop
hast
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